Reductive Strategies in the Sciences

The holy grail of behavioral neuroscience is a complete explanation of a complex behavior in terms of its underlying molecular components. Is such a "complete" biologically reductive explanation of behavior possible? In classical philosophical models of inter-theoretic reduction, higher-level theories can, in principle, be completely analyzed away or eliminated by teh appeal to lower-level theories. However, accompanying the growth of philosophy of biology in the last twenty years it has become apparent taht this model does not capture the way investigators in the biologically informed sciences actually carry out their research. Scientists are "epistemically profligate," using "inter-level" reductionist strategies that do not privilege a particular lower-level of description, but instead capitalizes on the conjunction of both lower- and higher-level properties in order to achieve research and explanatory goals. Three questions guide the current project: (1) what levels are most salient for research and explanatory purposes? (2) How do different levels map onto each other in the research and explanation? (3) What are the epistemic payoffs (and costs) to favofing inter-level explanatory reductions? For the 2009-2010 school year Prof. Benham will be supported by a Professional Development Fellowship, within the Science, Technology, and Society (STS, 08-533) program at the National Science Foundation. Prof. Benham will be pursue laboratory research in the lab of Erik Jorgensen, a neurogenetics laboratory at the University of Utah, on sex-specific behavior in C. elegans. As a model organism C. elegans is highly specified on cellular, genetic, and developmental levels and given its relative simplicity and invariance it is a promising candidate for reductionist strategies. Thus, Prof. Benham will work in the Jorgensen laboratory to garner first-hand experience in how reductive explanatory strategies are pursued in an active laboratory.

Deceptive Research

How do the methodological needs of research justify a violation of accepted prohibitions against deception? And how should this justified violation be redressed in the research context? My analysis of these questions suggests that greater attention should be given to the researcher-participant relationship than has previously been afforded. I argue, generally, that deception is best understood in the context of the expectations of human relationships. Not paying attention to this feature of deception leaves us with a very thin concept of deception, and a correspondingly thin concept of how to address its use in research contexts.

Selected Works

(In preparation) On the Variety of Deception in Research.

(In preparation) Is 'Authorized Deception' Ethical? (With Fred Rhodewalt)

(Planned) Assessing Psycho-social Risks in Deceptive Research.

2008. Debriefing and Moral Accountability, Kennedy Institute of Ethics Journal 18(3): 253-273.

2008. The Ubiquity of Deception and the Ethics of Deceptive Research, Bioethics 22(3): 147-56.

2006. On the Ethics of Deception in Social-Behavioral Research. Presented to Department of Psychology (Clinical Program) Louisiana State University, February 10.

2004. Deception in Social-Behavioral Research: How Much is Too Much? Presented to the 2004 ORI Research Conference on Research Integrity, San Diego, CA, November 13.

Research Ethics (General)

I have lectured widely on research issues and developed a number of interests in research ethics. In general I am interested in how different disciplines addresss the ethical demands of research regulation, human protections, and other research norms, including the relationship between science and society at large. Most recently I have turned to aspects of international research and the ethical challenges associated with HIV/AIDS prevention research in resource poor and devastated regions.

Selected Works

(In preparation) Neglected Ethical Aspects of International HIV Microbicide Research. (With Patrick Kiser)

(Under contract). A Casebook for Research Ethics. Roman & Littlefield Publishers.

2008. What's in a Name? American Journal of Bioethics 8(4): 47-49.

2008. An Overview of Responsible Research. Presented to Idaho National Laboratories, Idaho Falls, ID. August 7-8.

2008. Is It Ethical to Conduct Clinical Trials with Patients in Hospice Care? Presented to Evening Ethics Discussion, Division of Medical Ethics and Humanities. May 21.

2007. On the Communication of Values between Scientists and the Public, International Journal of Comparative Psychology 20: 20-24. (With Charles Shimp)

2007. Human Terrain Teams: Social Science at War. Presented to The Utah/Idaho Colloquium, at the University of Utah. November 2.

2006. Revisiting the Guiding Principles of Research Ethics, The Lancet 367, February 4: 387-88. (With Leslie Francis)

2006. Authorship: Credit and Responsibility. In Research Administration and Management. E. Kulakowski & L. Chronister, Eds. Boston: Jones and Bartlett Publishers: 501-510. (With Dale Clark and Leslie Francis)

2006. Human Values in the Scientific Method: Progress Report. Presented to The Human Values and Applied Ethics Symposium, University of Utah. August 25. (With Charles Shimp)

2002. The Descriptive and the Normative in Bioethics. Review of Bioethics in Social Context. Barry Hoffmaster, ed. (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 2001). In Techne: Journal of the Society for Philosophy and Technology, Fall.

Philosophy of Genetics

An emerging area of interests involves the ethical and ontological issues related to genetic research. For example, creating pigs with humanized hearts may not raise too many concerns, however intersting neural progenitor cells into embryonic mice or primates raises a few questions. What are the ontological and ethical implications of creating part-human hybrids? In addition, I am interested in what the history of eugenics has taught us and how those lessons have been interepreted in the context of reprogenetic and commercial genetic test.

Selected Works

(In press). Moral Confusion and Developmental Essentialism in Part-Human Hybrid Research. American Journal of Bioethics. (With Matt Haber)

(Planned) What are the Real Lessons of Eugenics?

(Planned) From Genetic Essentialism to Developmental Essentialism. (With Matt Haber)

 

Philosophy of Psychology and Neuroscience

I have a long-standing philosophical interest in neuro-cognitive (and genetic) explanations of behavior that have direct implications for notions of agency and concepts of self. There are a number of different reserach projects I have undertaken. For example, I am interested in the conceptual and explanatory use of "self" as a psychological construct and its connections to other cognitive level understandings of memory and pain. I am also interested in how the methodological and conceptual commitments of cognitive (and developmental) psychology will mesh with the different commitments of the neurosciences. With the advent of new imaging technology, the dynamic between cognitive and neurological descriptions of complex human behavior promises insight into many philosophical puzzles about evidence and theory formation. For example, memory research traditionally relies on a distinction between short-term and long-term memory systems, but recently neuro-imaging of memory tasks may challenge the methodological andtheoretical commitments of this distinction. Likewise, various neuroscience descriptions of certain cognitive capacities have attempted to localize the self in the brain; a curious development given there is no consensus psychology regarding the nature of self concepts. I am also interested in how we understand the psychological and biological continuity (or discontinuity) between humans and non-human animals.

Selected Works

2008. Is Neuroscience the New Philosophy? Presented to Department of Psychology, Weber State University. April 15.

2006. The Self in Pain: Permeable and Unstable Boundaries. Presented at "Exploring the Boundaries of Exerience and Self," Consciousness and Experiential Section of the British Psychological Society, 10th Annual Conference, Oxford, UK. September 16.

2006. Persisting Difficulties in Overcoming Dualism: Biopsychosocial Models of Pain. Presented to Toward a Science of Consciousness 2006, Tucson, AZ. April 7. (With Yoshi Nakamura)

2006. Is the Self Necessarily a Unity? Presented to the Department of Political Science and Philosophy, Weber State University. March 3.

2005. Falsification in Social Science Method and Theory, in Encyclopedia of Social Measurement, Vaol. 2. Edited by K. Kempf-Leonard. San Diego: Elsevier: 9-14. (With Charles Shimp)

2003. A Self without Memory. Presented to the 2003 Western Humanities Alliance, Salt Lake City, UT, October 16.

2002. Is There an Evolutionary Principle of Psychological Continuity? Presented to Department of Philosophy Colloquium Series, University of Utah. November 15.

2000. Ryle and the Para-mechanical, Southwest Philosophical Studies 22: 10-18.

Terrorism, Bioterrorism, and Just War

The events of September 11, 2001 had a profound influence on my personal and philosophical development. Since then I have been keenly interested in how war and the threat of aggression impacts our decisions about ethical issues. For instance, how should we ethically assess our actions when conditions of social normalcy have broekn down? In war – the most extreme breakdown of social norms – how should ethical considerations constrain our actions when those constraints may put us at serious risk? Is there a workable notion of justice (or fairness) in wartime activities? I have approached these questions by examining how asymmetric conflicts and unconventional tactics (terrorism and biowarfare) put these questions in hight relief.

Selected Works

2006. Bioterrorism: Policy Considerations for the Research Institution. In Research Administration and Management. E. Kulakowski & L. Chronister, Eds. Boston: Jones and Bartlett Publishers: 601-616.

2004. The Ethics of Biological Warfare. Presented to the Frankenstein Exhibit Lecture Series at the Salt Lake City Library. Sponsored by The Utah Humanities Council. July 28.

2004. The Ethics of Bioterrorism. Presented to the Governor's Honors Academy at Southern Utah University. July 15.

2003. Pre-emptive Justifications for War on Iraq: Just Cause, Terrorism, and Weapons of Mass Destruction. Presented to the 20th International Social Philosophy Conference. Boston, MA; July 17-19.

2003. Bioterrorism and Just War Theory. Presented to the Moab Society for Peace and International Justice. Moab, UT. October.

2002. Just War Theory, First Strike Policy, and Justifications for Military Action Against Iraq. Panel Presentation for A Forum on a US Led War on Iraq: Legal, Political and Ethical Considerations. College of Law, University of Utah. November 25.