аЯрЁБс>ўџ ˜šўџџџ–—џџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџьЅС` јП>jjbjb $z|c|c$dџџџџџџˆЦЦЦЦЦЦЦВz z z 8В Ю В[ъі  ". . . . . . вдддддд,ER—\Ц. . . . . J ЦЦ. . J J J . @Ц. Ц. вJ к„^TЦЦЦЦ. вJ J †ЦЦвъ ƒ‡WПz n мžв+0[І,ѓJ ѓвJ ЦВВЄV $ВВV  G. H. Mead Excerpted from Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy ( HYPERLINK "http://www.iep.utm.edu/m/mead.htm#SH3c" www.iep.utm.edu/m/mead.htm#SH3c, Sept. 21, 2005.) 3c. Self and Other The Self as Social Emergent The self, like the mind, is a social emergent. This social conception of the self, Mead argues, entails that individual selves are the products of social interaction and not the (logical or biological) preconditions of that interaction. Mead contrasts his social theory of the self with individualistic theories of the self (i.e., theories that presuppose the priority of selves to social process). "The self is something which has a development; it is not initially there, at birth, but arises in the process of social experience and activity, that is, develops in the given individual as a result of his relations to that process as a whole and to other individuals within that process" (Mind, Self and Society 135). Mead's model of society is an organic model in which individuals are related to the social process as bodily parts are related to bodies. The self is a reflective process — i.e., "it is an object to itself." For Mead, it is the reflexivity of the self that "distinguishes it from other objects and from the body." For the body and other objects are not objects to themselves as the self is. It is perfectly true that the eye can see the foot, but it does not see the body as a whole. We cannot see our backs; we can feel certain portions of them, if we are agile, but we cannot get an experience of our whole body. There are, of course, experiences which are somewhat vague and difficult of location, but the bodily experiences are for us organized about a self. The foot and hand belong to the self. We can see our feet, especially if we look at them from the wrong end of an opera glass, as strange things which we have difficulty in recognizing as our own. The parts of the body are quite distinguishable from the self. We can lose parts of the body without any serious invasion of the self. The mere ability to experience different parts of the body is not different from the experience of a table. The table presents a different feel from what the hand does when one hand feels another, but it is an experience of something with which we come definitely into contact. The body does not experience itself as a whole, in the sense in which the self in some way enters into the experience of the self (Mind, Self and Society 136). It is, moreover, this reflexivity of the self that distinguishes human from animal consciousness (Mind, Self and Society, fn., 137). Mead points out two uses of the term "consciousness": (1) "consciousness" may denote "a certain feeling consciousness" which is the outcome of an organism's sensitivity to its environment (in this sense, animals, in so far as they act with reference to events in their environments, are conscious); and (2) "consciousness" may refer to a form of awareness "which always has, implicitly at least, the reference to an 'I' in it" (i.e., the term "consciousness" may mean self- consciousness) (Mind, Self and Society 165). It is the second use of the term "consciousness" that is appropriate to the discussion of human consciousness. While there is a form of pre-reflective consciousness that refers to the "bare thereness of the world," it is reflective (or self-) consciousness that characterizes human awareness. The pre-reflective world is a world in which the self is absent (Mind, Self and Society 135-136). Self-consciousness, then, involves the objectification of the self. In the mode of self- consciousness, the "individual enters as such into his own experience . . . as an object" (Mind, Self and Society 225). How is this objectification of the self possible? The individual, according to Mead, "can enter as an object [to himself] only on the basis of social relations and interactions, only by means of his experiential transactions with other individuals in an organized social environment" (Mind, Self and Society 225). Self-consciousness is the result of a process in which the individual takes the attitudes of others toward herself, in which she attempts to view herself from the standpoint of others. The self-as-object arises out of the individual's experience of other selves outside of herself. The objectified self is an emergent within the social structures and processes of human intersubjectivity. Symbolic Interaction and the Emergence of the Self Mead's account of the social emergence of the self is developed further through an elucidation of three forms of inter-subjective activity: language, play, and the game. These forms of "symbolic interaction" (i.e., social interactions that take place via shared symbols such as words, definitions, roles, gestures, rituals, etc.) are the major paradigms in Mead's theory of socialization and are the basic social processes that render the reflexive objectification of the self possible. Language, as we have seen, is communication via "significant symbols," and it is through significant communication that the individual is able to take the attitudes of others toward herself. Language is not only a "necessary mechanism" of mind, but also the primary social foundation of the self: I know of no other form of behavior than the linguistic in which the individual is an object to himself . . . (Mind, Self and Society 142). When a self does appear it always involves an experience of another; there could not be an experience of a self simply by itself. The plant or the lower animal reacts to its environment, but there is no experience of a self . . . . When the response of the other becomes an essential part in the experience or conduct of the individual; when taking the attitude of the other becomes an essential part in his behavior — then the individual appears in his own experience as a self; and until this happens he does not appear as a self (Mind, Self and Society 195). Within the linguistic act, the individual takes the role of the other, i.e., responds to her own gestures in terms of the symbolized attitudes of others. This "process of taking the role of the other" within the process of symbolic interaction is the primal form of self-objectification and is essential to self- realization (Mind, Self and Society 160-161). It ought to be clear, then, that the self-as-object of which Mead speaks is not an object in a mechanistic, billiard ball world of external relations, but rather it is a basic structure of human experience that arises in response to other persons in an organic social-symbolic world of internal (and inter- subjective) relations. This becomes even clearer in Mead's interpretation of playing and gaming. In playing and gaming, as in linguistic activity, the key to the generation of self-consciousness is the process of role-playing." In play, the child takes the role of another and acts as though she were the other (e.g., mother, doctor, nurse, Indian, and countless other symbolized roles). This form of role-playing involves a single role at a time. Thus, the other which comes into the child's experience in play is a "specific other" (The Philosophy of the Present 169). The game involves a more complex form of role-playing than that involved in play. In the game, the individual is required to internalize, not merely the character of a single and specific other, but the roles of all others who are involved with him in the game. He must, moreover, comprehend the rules of the game which condition the various roles (Mind, Self and Society 151). This configuration of roles-organized-according-to- rules brings the attitudes of all participants together to form a symbolized unity: this unity is the "generalized other" (Mind, Self and Society 154). The generalized other is "an organized and generalized attitude" (Mind, Self and Society 195) with reference to which the individual defines her own conduct. When the individual can view herself from the standpoint of the generalized other, "self- consciousness in the full sense of the term" is attained. The game, then, is the stage of the social process at which the individual attains selfhood. One of Mead's most outstanding contributions to the development of critical social theory is his analysis of games. Mead elucidates the full social and psychological significance of game-playing and the extent to which the game functions as an instrument of social control. The following passage contains a remarkable piece of analysis: What goes on in the game goes on in the life of the child all the time. He is continually taking the attitudes of those about him, especially the roles of those who in some sense control him and on whom he depends. He gets the function of the process in an abstract way at first. It goes over from the play into the game in a real sense. He has to play the game. The morale of the game takes hold of the child more than the larger morale of the whole community. The child passes into the game and the game expresses a social situation in which he can completely enter; its morale may have a greater hold on him than that of the family to which he belongs or the community in which he lives. There are all sorts of social organizations, some of which are fairly lasting, some temporary, into which the child is entering, and he is playing a sort of social game in them. It is a period in which he likes "to belong," and he gets into organizations which come into existence and pass out of existence. He becomes a something which can function in the organized whole, and thus tends to determine himself in his relationship with the group to which he belongs. That process is one which is a striking stage in the development of the child's morale. It constitutes him a self-conscious member of the community to which he belongs (Mind, Self and Society 160, emphasis added). The "Me" and the "I" Although the self is a product of socio-symbolic interaction, it is not merely a passive reflection of the generalized other. The individual's response to the social world is active; she decides what she will do in the light of the attitudes of others; but her conduct is not mechanically determined by such attitudinal structures. There are, it would appear, two phases (or poles) of the self: (1) that phase which reflects the attitude of the generalized other and (2) that phase which responds to the attitude of the generalized other. Here, Mead distinguishes between the "me" and the "I." The "me" is the social self, and the "I" is a response to the "me" (Mind, Self and Society 178). "The 'I' is the response of the organism to the attitudes of the others; the 'me' is the organized set of attitudes of others which one himself assumes" (Mind, Self and Society 175). Mead defines the "me" as "a conventional, habitual individual," and the "I" as the "novel reply" of the individual to the generalized other (Mind, Self and Society 197). There is a dialectical relationship between society and the individual; and this dialectic is enacted on the intra-psychic level in terms of the polarity of the "me" and the "I." The "me" is the internalization of roles which derive from such symbolic processes as linguistic interaction, playing, and gaming; whereas the "I" is a "creative response" to the symbolized structures of the "me" (i.e., to the generalized other). Although the "I" is not an object of immediate experience, it is, in a sense, knowable (i.e., objectifiable). The "I" is apprehended in memory; but in the memory image, the "I" is no longer a pure subject, but "a subject that is now an object of observation" (Selected Writings 142). We can understand the structural and functional significance of the "I," but we cannot observe it directly — it appears only ex post facto. We remember the responses of the "I" to the "me;" and this is as close as we can get to a concrete knowledge of the "I." The objectification of the "I" is possible only through an awareness of the past; but the objectified "I" is never the subject of present experience. "If you ask, then, where directly in your own experience the 'I' comes in, the answer is that it comes in as a historical figure" (Mind, Self and Society 174). The "I" appears as a symbolized object in our consciousness of our past actions, but then it has become part of the "me." The "me" is, in a sense, that phase of the self that represents the past (i.e., the already-established generalized other). The "I," which is a response to the "me," represents action in a present (i.e., "that which is actually going on, taking place") and implies the restructuring of the "me" in a future. After the "I" has acted, "we can catch it in our memory and place it in terms of that which we have done," but it is now (in the newly emerged present) an aspect of the restructured "me" (Mind, Self and Society 204, 203). Because of the temporal-historical dimension of the self, the character of the "I" is determinable only after it has occurred; the "I" is not, therefore, subject to predetermination. Particular acts of the "I" become aspects of the "me" in the sense that they are objectified through memory; but the "I" as such is not contained in the "me." The human individual exists in a social situation and responds to that situation. The situation has a particular character, but this character does not completely determine the response of the individual; there seem to be alternative courses of action. The individual must select a course of action (and even a decision to do "nothing" is a response to the situation) and act accordingly, but the course of action she selects is not dictated by the situation. It is this indeterminacy of response that "gives the sense of freedom, of initiative" (Mind, Self and Society 177). The action of the "I" is revealed only in the action itself; specific prediction of the action of the "I" is not possible. The individual is determined to respond, but the specific character of her response is not fully determined. The individual's responses are conditioned, but not determined by the situation in which she acts (Mind, Self and Society 210-211). Human freedom is conditioned freedom. Thus, the "I" and the "me" exist in dynamic relation to one another. The human personality (or self) arises in a social situation. This situation structures the "me" by means of inter-subjective symbolic processes (language, gestures, play, games, etc.), and the active organism, as it continues to develop, must respond to its situation and to its "me." This response of the active organism is the "I." The individual takes the attitude of the "me" or the attitude of the "I" according to situations in which she finds herself. For Mead, "both aspects of the 'I' and the 'me' are essential to the self in its full expression" (Mind, Self and Society 199). Both community and individual autonomy are necessary to identity. The "I" is process breaking through structure. The "me" is a necessary symbolic structure which renders the action of the "I" possible, and "without this structure of things, the life of the self would become impossible" (Mind, Self and Society 214). The Dialectic of Self and Other The self arises when the individual takes the attitude of the generalized other toward herself. This "internalization" of the generalized other occurs through the individual's participation in the conversation of significant symbols (i.e., language) and in other socialization processes (e.g., play and games). The self, then, is of great value to organized society: the internalization of the conversation of significant symbols and of other interactional symbolic structures allows for "the superior co-ordination" of "society as a whole," and for the "increased efficiency of the individual as a member of the group" (Mind, Self and Society 179). The generalized other (internalized in the "me") is a major instrument of social control; it is the mechanism by which the community gains control "over the conduct of its individual members" (Mind, Self and Society 155)."Social control," in Mead's words, "is the expression of the 'me' over against the expression of the 'I'" (Mind, Self and Society 210). The genesis of the self in social process is thus a condition of social control. The self is a social emergent that supports the cohesion of the group; individual will is harmonized, by means of a socially defined and symbolized "reality," with social goals and values. "In so far as there are social acts," writes Mead, "there are social objects, and I take it that social control is bringing the act of the individual into relation with this social object" (The Philosophy of the Act 191). Thus, there are two dimensions of Mead's theory of internalization: (1) the internalization of the attitudes of others toward oneself and toward one another (i.e., internalization of the interpersonal process); and (2) the internalization of the attitudes of others "toward the various phases or aspects of the common social activity or set of social undertakings in which, as members of an organized society or social group, they are all engaged" (Mind, Self and Society 154-155). The self, then, has reference, not only to others, but to social projects and goals, and it is by means of the socialization process (i.e., the internalization of the generalized other through language, play, and the game) that the individual is brought to "assume the attitudes of those in the group who are involved with him in his social activities" (The Philosophy of the Act 192). By learning to speak, gesture, and play in "appropriate" ways, the individual is brought into line with the accepted symbolized roles and rules of the social process. The self is therefore one of the most subtle and effective instruments of social control. For Mead, however, social control has its limits. One of these limits is the phenomenon of the "I," as described in the preceding section. Another limit to social control is presented in Mead's description of specific social relations. This description has important consequences regarding the way in which the concept of the generalized other is to be applied in social analysis. The self emerges out of "a special set of social relations with all the other individuals" involved in a given set of social projects (Mind, Self and Society 156-157). The self is always a reflection of specific social relations that are themselves founded on the specific mode of activity of the group in question. The concept of property, for example, presupposes a community with certain kinds of responses; the idea of property has specific social and historical foundations and symbolizes the interests and values of specific social groups. Mead delineates two types of social groups in civilized communities. There are, on the one hand, "concrete social classes or subgroups" in which "individual members are directly related to one another." On the other hand, there are "abstract social classes or subgroups" in which "individual members are related to one another only more or less indirectly, and which only more or less indirectly function as social units, but which afford unlimited possibilities for the widening and ramifying and enriching of the social relations among all the individual members of the given society as an organized and unified whole" (Mind, Self and Society 157). Such abstract social groups provide the opportunity for a radical extension of the "definite social relations" which constitute the individual's sense of self and which structure her conduct. Human society, then, contains a multiplicity of generalized others. The individual is capable of holding membership in different groups, both simultaneously and serially, and may therefore relate herself to different generalized others at different times; or she may extend her conception of the generalized other by identifying herself with a "larger" community than the one in which she has hitherto been involved (e.g., she may come to view herself as a member of a nation rather than as a member of a tribe). The self is not confined within the limits of any one generalized other. It is true that the self arises through the internalization of the generalized attitudes of others, but there is, it would appear, no absolute limit to the individual's capacity to encompass new others within the dynamic structure of the self. This makes strict and total social control difficult if not impossible. Mead's description of social relations also has interesting implications vis-a-vis the sociological problem of the relation between consensus and conflict in society. It is clear that both consensus and conflict are significant dimensions of social process; and in Mead's view, the problem is not to decide either for a consensus model of society or for a conflict model, but to describe as directly as possible the function of both consensus and conflict in human social life. There are two models of consensus-conflict relation in Mead's analysis of social relations. These may be schematized as follows: Intra-Group Consensus — Extra-Group Conflict Intra-Group Conflict — Extra-Group Consensus In the first model, the members of a given group are united in opposition to another group which is characterized as the "common enemy" of all members of the first group. Mead points out that the idea of a common enemy is central in much of human social organization and that it is frequently the major reference-point of intra-group consensus. For example, a great many human organizations derive their raison d'etre and their sense of solidarity from the existence (or putative existence) of the "enemy" (communists, atheists, infidels, fascist pigs, religious "fanatics," liberals, conservatives, or whatever). The generalized other of such an organization is formed in opposition to the generalized other of the enemy. The individual is "with" the members of her group and "against" members of the enemy group. Mead's second model, that of intra-group conflict and extra-group consensus, is employed in his description of the process in which the individual reacts against her own group. The individual opposes her group by appealing to a "higher sort of community" that she holds to be superior to her own. She may do this by appealing to the past (e.g., she may ground her criticism of the bureaucratic state in a conception of "Jeffersonian Democracy"), or by appealing to the future (e.g., she may point to the ideal of "all mankind," of the universal community, an ideal that has the future as its ever-receding reference point). Thus, intra-group conflict is carried on in terms of an extra-group consensus, even if the consensus is merely assumed or posited. This model presupposes Mead's conception of the multiplicity of generalized others, i.e., the field within which conflicts are possible. It is also true that the individual can criticize her group only in so far as she can symbolize to herself the generalized other of that group; otherwise she would have nothing to criticize, nor would she have the motivation to do so. It is in this sense that social criticism presupposes social- symbolic process and a social self capable of symbolic reflexive activity. In addition to the above-described models of consensus-conflict relation, Mead also points out an explicitly temporal interaction between consensus and conflict. Human conflicts often lead to resolutions that create new forms of consensus. Thus, when such conflicts occur, they can lead to whole "reconstructions of the particular social situations" that are the contexts of the conflicts (e.g., a war between two nations may be followed by new political alignments in which the two warring nations become allies). Such reconstructions of society are effected by the minds of individuals in conflict and constitute enlargements of the social whole. An interesting consequence of Mead's analysis of social conflict is that the reconstruction of society will entail the reconstruction of the self. This aspect of the social dynamic is particularly clear in terms of Mead's concept of intra-group conflict and his description of the dialectic of the "me" and the "I." As pointed out earlier, the "I" is an emergent response to the generalized other; and the "me" is that phase of the self that represents the social situation within which the individual must operate. Thus, the critical capacity of the self takes form in the "I" and has two dimensions: (1) explicit self- criticism (aimed at the "me") is implicit social criticism; and (2) explicit social criticism is implicit self- criticism. For example, the criticism of one's own moral principles is also the criticism of the morality of one's social world, for personal morality is rooted in social morality. Conversely, the criticism of the morality of one's society raises questions concerning one's own moral role in the social situation. Since self and society are dialectical poles of a single process, change in one pole will result in change in the other pole. It would appear that social reconstructions are effected by individuals (or groups of individuals) who find themselves in conflict with a given society; and once the reconstruction is accomplished, the new social situation generates far-reaching changes in the personality structures of the individuals involved in that situation." In short," writes Mead, "social reconstruction and self or personality reconstruction are the two sides of a single process — the process of human social evolution" (Mind, Self and Society 309). 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Selџџ-џўџРџЎ)‰f-) and-§ Q)U -) Other-џ€\)r -(эw The Self aџџ-џўџРџЎ)зs-) Sociaџџ-џўџРџЎ)l-) Emergent-џ€\)р -(jwThe selfџџ-џўџРџЎ)Ѓ,-)  like-§ Q)X -) thџџ-џўџРџЎ)'e-) mindџџ-џўџРџЎ)t,-)  is-§ Q). -) aџџ-џўџРџЎ) -) social-§ Q)t -) emergenџџ-џўџРџЎ)Ќt-) . This-§ Q)r -) socialџџ-џўџРџЎ)t -) conception-§ Q)л -) ofџџ-џўџРџЎ)* -) thџџ-џўџРџЎ)'e-) selfџџ-џўџРџЎ)U,-)  Mead-§ Q)~ -(Ѓwargues, entails that individuaџџ-џўџРџЎ(ЃЗl-)  selves-§ Q)† -) areџџ-џўџРџЎ)= -) the-§ Q)= -) produџџ-џўџРџЎ)uc-)ts-§ Q)! -) ofџџ-џўџРџЎ)* -) social-§ Q)t -) interactioџџ-џўџРџЎ)Нn-) and-§ Q)U -) noџџ-џўџРџЎ)2t-)  the (нw (logical oџџ-џўџРџЎ)Пr-) biologicalџџ-џўџРџЎ)е)-) preconditions-§ Q(нH -) oџџ-џўџРџЎ)f-) that-§ Q)X -) iџџ-џўџРџЎ)n-) teraction.-§ Q)М -) Meadџџ-џўџРџЎ)q -) contrasts-§ Q)Б -) hisџџ-џўџРџЎ): -) social-§ Q)t -) theorџџ-џўџРџЎ)gy -(w of the selџџ-џўџРџЎ)Иf-) with-§ Q)f -) indiџџ-џўџРџЎ)Nv-)i)dualistic theories oџџ-џўџРџЎ( f-) the-§ Q)J -) selfџў-џ§џ€џ\)H џџ-џўџРџЎ) (-)i.e.џџ-џўџРџЎ)>,-) theories-§ Q)Ћ -) thaџџ-џўџРџЎ)=t-) presuppose-§ Q)э -) theџў-џ§џ€џ\)= -(Qwprioritџџ-џўџРџЎ)~y-) of-§ Q)7 -) selvesџџ-џўџРџЎ)y -) to-§ Q)' -) socialџџ-џўџРџЎ)t p-)%rocess).-§ Q)š -) "Theџџ-џўџРџЎ)b -) self-§ Q)H -) isџџ-џўџРџЎ)! -) sџџ-џўџРџЎ)o-)mething-§ Q)Є -) whichџџ-џўџРџЎ)z -) has-§ Q)B -) aџџ-џўџРџЎ) -) developmentџџ-џўџРџЎ(Q;-)  it-§ Q)) -) isџў-џ§џ€џ\)! -(Šw not initiallџџ-џўџРџЎ)аy-) thereџџ-џўџРџЎ)q,-)  at-§ Q)1 -) bџџ-џўџРџЎ)i-) rthџџ-џўџРџЎ)8,-)  but-§ Q)M -) aџџ-џўџРџЎ)r-)ises-§ Q)J -) inџџ-џўџРџЎ)' -) the-§ Q)= -) processџџ-џўџРџЎ)• -) of-§ Q)* -) socialџџ-џўџРџЎ)t -) experience-§ Q)и -) anџџ-џўџРџЎ)/d-) activityџџ-џўџРџЎ)Ѓ,-)  thatџџ-џўџРџЎ)X -(Фwis, develops in theџџ-џўџРџЎ(Фс -) given-§ Q)o -) individuaџџ-џўџРџЎ)Нl-)  as-§ Q)6 -) aџџ-џўџРџЎ) -) result-§ Q)o џџ-џўџРџЎ) o-)f-§ Q) -) hџџ-џўџРџЎ)i-) s-§ Q) -) relationsџџ-џўџРџЎ)Ќ -) to-§ Q)' -) thaџџ-џўџРџЎ)=t-)  process-§ Q)Ђ -) asџџ-џўџРџЎ)) -) a-§ Q) -) wholeџў-џ§џ€џ\)z -(ўw and to otheџџ-џўџРџЎ)пr-) individuals-§ Q)ы -) withiџџ-џўџРџЎ)gn-) that-§ Q)X џџ-џўџРџЎ) p-)rocess"-§ Q) -) () Mind, Selџџ-џўџРџЎ)Сf-)  and-§ Q)X -) Society) 13џџ-џўџРџЎ)?5-))џџ-џўџРџЎ).-)  Mead's-§ Q)š -) modelџџ-џўџРџЎ)} -(7wof society is an џџ-џўџРџЎ(7Вo-)rganic-§ Q)} -) modelџџ-џўџРџЎ)} -) iџџ-џўџРџЎ)n-) which-§ Q)‡ -) inџџ-џўџРџЎ)'d-)ividuals-§ Q)ž -) areџџ-џўџРџЎ)= -) related to-§ Q)Л -) thџџ-џўџРџЎ)'e-) so)9cial process as (qwbodily parts arџџ-џўџРџЎ(q™e-) related-§ Q)• -) tџџ-џўџРџЎ)o-) bodies.-џ€\)œ -(юw The self is џџ-џўџРџЎ)оa-) reflective-§ Q)Ъ џџ-џўџРџЎ) p-)rocess-§ Q)| -) б)2 i.џџ-џўџРџЎ)(e-).џџ-џўџРџЎ) ,-)  "it-§ Q)= -) isџџ-џўџРџЎ)! -) aџџ-џўџРџЎ)n-) object-§ Q)‡ -) toџџ-џўџРџЎ)' -) itselџџ-џўџРџЎ)Sf-)."-§ Q)! -) Foџџ-џўџРџЎ)5r-) Mead,-§ Q)‹ -) iџџ-џўџРџЎ)t-)  is-§ Q). -) theџў-џ§џ€џ\)= -('w reflexivity џџ-џўџРџЎ)оo-)f-§ Q) -) thџџ-џўџРџЎ)'e-) self-§ Q)U -) thatџџ-џўџРџЎ)K -) "distinguishes-§ Q('™ -) itџџ-џўџРџЎ) f-)rom-§ Q)Q џџ-џўџРџЎ) ot-)%her-§ Q)@ -) objectsџџ-џўџРџЎ) -) and-§ Q)H џџ-џўџРџЎ) f-)rom-§ Q)Q -) thџџ-џўџРџЎ)'e-) body."-§ Q)’ -) Fџџ-џўџРџЎ)o-)r-§ Q) -) thџџ-џўџРџЎ)'e -(aw body and otheџџ-џўџРџЎ(a“r-) objec)y ts are noџџ-џўџРџЎ)Њt-)  objects-§ Q)š -) toџџ-џўџРџЎ)' -) themselџџ-џўџРџЎ)›v-)es-§ Q)) -) asџџ-џўџРџЎ)) -) the-§ Q)= -) selfџџ-џўџРџЎ)H -) is.-џ€\). -(оwIt is peџџ-џўџРџЎ)‰r-)fectly-§ Q)r -) truџџ-џўџРџЎ)8e-) that-§ Q)X -) thџџ-џўџРџЎ)'e-) eye-§ Q)R -) canџџ-џўџРџЎ)E -) see-§ Q)? -) theџџ-џўџРџЎ)= -) foџџ-џўџРџЎ)*o-)tџџ-џўџРџЎ),-)  buџџ-џўџРџЎ)?t-)  it-§ Q)) -) doesџџ-џўџРџЎ)[ -) noџџ-џўџРџЎ)2t-)  see-§ Q)L -) theџџ-џўџРџЎ)= -) body-§ Q)d -) asџџ-џўџРџЎ)) -) a-§ Q) -) whџџ-џўџРџЎ)=o-)le. (w#We cannot see our backs; we can feeџџ-џўџРџЎ(Yl-)  certain-§ Q)• -) poџџ-џўџРџЎ)2r-)tџџ-џўџРџЎ)i-) ons-§ Q)E -) ofџџ-џўџРџЎ)* -) themџџ-џўџРџЎ)d,-)  iџџ-џўџРџЎ)f-) we-§ Q)G -) arџџ-џўџРџЎ)'e-) agile,-§ Q){ -) bџџ-џўџРџЎ)u-)t-§ Q) -) weџў-џ§џ€џ\): -(Qwcannot get an experience oџџ-џўџРџЎ(Qf-) ouџџ-џўџРџЎ)?r-) whole-§ Q)‡ -) bodџџ-џўџРџЎ)Ky-). There-§ Q)Ž -) are,џџ-џўџРџЎ)J o-)%f-§ Q) -) courseџџ-џўџРџЎ)‚,-) experiences-§ Q)ј -) whichџџ-џўџРџЎ)z -) are (‹wsomewhat vague and difficulџџ-џўџРџЎ(‹Лt-)  oџџ-џўџРџЎ)&f-) location,-§ Q)Л -) bџџ-џўџРџЎ)u-)t-§ Q) -) thџџ-џўџРџЎ)'e-) џџ-џўџРџЎ) b-)odily-§ Q)g -) experiencesџџ-џўџРџЎ)ы -) are-§ Q)= -) foџџ-џўџРџЎ)*r-) us-§ Q)9 -) organizedџў-џ§џ€џ\)Х -(Фw about a selfџџ-џўџРџЎ)ч.-) The foot-§ Q)И -) anџџ-џўџРџЎ)/d-) hand-§ Q)n -) belongџџ-џўџРџЎ)ˆ -) tџџ-џўџРџЎ)o-) the-§ Q)J -) selџџ-џўџРџЎ)7f-). We-§ Q)^ -) canџџ-џўџРџЎ)E -) see-§ Q)? -) ourџџ-џўџРџЎ)C -) feetџџ-џўџРџЎ)K,-) especially-§ Q)д -) ifџџ-џўџРџЎ) -) wџџ-џўџРџЎ)$e -(ўw look at theџџ-џўџРџЎ)дm-)& fr)/oџџ-џўџРџЎ)m-)& the-§ Q)J џџ-џўџРџЎ) w-)#rong-§ Q)\ -) endџџ-џўџРџЎ)H o-)%f-§ Q) -) aџџ-џўџРџЎ)n-) opera-§ Q)| -) glassџџ-џўџРџЎ)c,-)  as-§ Q)6 -) strangeџџ-џўџРџЎ) -) things-§ Q)z -) whichџџ-џўџРџЎ)z -) we-§ Q): -) haveџў-џ§џ€џ\)^ -(8w difficultyџџ-џўџРџЎ)Л -) in-§ Q)' -) recognizinџџ-џўџРџЎ)гg-) as-§ Q)6 -) ourџџ-џўџРџЎ)C -) owџџ-џўџРџЎ)=n-). The-§ Q)g -) partsџџ-џўџРџЎ)a o-)%f-§ Q) џџ-џўџРџЎ) t-) he-§ Q)/ -) bodyџџ-џўџРџЎ)d -) are-§ Q)= -) quџџ-џўџРџЎ)2i-) te-§ Q)$ -) distinguishableџџ-џўџРџЎ(8џ -) froџџ-џўџРџЎ);m -(rwthe self. We canџџ-џўџРџЎ(rК -) lose-§ Q)P -) partsџџ-џўџРџЎ)a -) oџџ-џўџРџЎ)f-) the-§ Q)J -) bodџџ-џўџРџЎ)Ky-) without-§ Q)І -) anџџ-џўџРџЎ)/y-) serious-§ Q)š -) invasionџџ-џўџРџЎ)Љ -) of-§ Q)* -) thџџ-џўџРџЎ)'e-) selfџџ-џўџРџЎ)U.-)  The-§ Q)[ -) mџџ-џўџРџЎ)'e-)re (Ћwabilit)gy to experience џџ-џўџРџЎ(Ћd-)ifferenџџ-џўџРџЎ)†t-)  parts-§ Q)n -) oџџ-џўџРџЎ)f-) the-§ Q)J -) bodџџ-џўџРџЎ)Ky-) is not-§ Q)z -) diffџџ-џўџРџЎ)Ie-)rent-§ Q)N џџ-џўџРџЎ) f-)rom-§ Q)Q -) thџџ-џўџРџЎ)'e-) experience-§ Q)х -) oџџ-џўџРџЎ)f-) a (хw table. Thџџ-џўџРџЎ)Гe-) table-§ Q)n -) presentsџџ-џўџРџЎ)Ѓ -) a-§ Q) -) diџџ-џўџРџЎ)'f-) ferent feel-§ Q)Ь џџ-џўџРџЎ) f-)rom-§ Q)Q -) whaџџ-џўџРџЎ)St-)  the-§ Q)J -) handџџ-џўџРџЎ)a -) does-§ Q)[ -) whenџџ-џўџРџЎ)l -) onџџ-џўџРџЎ)2e-) hand-§ Q)n -) feelsџў-џ§џ€џ\)^ -( w another, buџџ-џўџРџЎ)тt-)  it is-§ Q)V -) anџџ-џўџРџЎ)/ -) experience-§ Q)и -) oџџ-џўџРџЎ)f-) something-§ Q)н -) witџџ-џўџРџЎ)@h -)$which-§ Q)z -) weџџ-џўџРџЎ): -) come-§ Q)l -) definitelџџ-џўџРџЎ)Їy-) into-§ Q)[ -) co)/ntacџџ-џўџРџЎ)St-) . ( YwThe body does noџџ-џўџРџЎ( Yнt-) experience-§ Q)х -) itselfџџ-џўџРџЎ)d -) as-§ Q)) -) aџџ-џўџРџЎ) -) wholџџ-џўџРџЎ)de-),-§ Q)  -) iџџ-џўџРџЎ)n -)$the-§ Q)= -) senseџџ-џўџРџЎ)k -) in-§ Q)' -) whichџџ-џўџРџЎ)z -) the-§ Q)= -) selfџџ-џўџРџЎ)H -) iџџ-џўџРџЎ)n-) some ( ’wway enters into thџџ-џўџРџЎ( ’нe-) experience-§ Q)х -) ofџџ-џўџРџЎ)* -) thџџ-џўџРџЎ)'e-) self-§ Q)U џџ-џўџРџЎ) (-)Mindџџ-џўџРџЎ)j,-)  џџ-џўџРџЎ) S-)elf-§ Q)2 -) andџџ-џўџРџЎ)K -) Society) 13џџ-џўџРџЎ)?6-)).-џ€\) -( ЬwIt isџџ-џўџРџЎ)M,-)  moreoveџџ-џўџРџЎ)Мr-),-§ Q)  -) thisџў-џ§џ€џ\)H -) reflexivitџџ-џўџРџЎ)Иy-) of the-§ Q)€ -) selfџџ-џўџРџЎ)H -) thaџџ-џўџРџЎ)=t-)  distџџ-џўџРџЎ)Ui-) nguishes-§ Q)Ў -) humanџџ-џўџРџЎ)ˆ -) from-§ Q)b -) animaџџ-џўџРџЎ)zl -( wconsci)ousn-§ Q)^e-)ssџџ-џўџРџЎ)& -) () Mind, Selџџ-џўџРџЎ)Сf-)  and-§ Q)X -) Societyџџ-џўџРџЎ),-)  fџџ-џўџРџЎ)n-).џџ-џўџРџЎ) ,-)  137)џџ-џўџРџЎ)i. -)Mead-§ Q)q -) pointsџџ-џўџРџЎ)z -) out-§ Q)@ -) twoџџ-џўџРџЎ)K -) uses-§ Q)U -) ofџџ-џўџРџЎ)* -) thџџ-џўџРџЎ)'e-) terџџ-џўџРџЎ)Bm -( @w"conscio-§ Q)Ќu-)sne-§ Q)Bs-)s":џџ-џўџРџЎ)5 -) (1)-§ Q); -) "consciousne-§ Q( @$s-)s"џџ-џўџРџЎ)' -) may-§ Q)V -) denoteџџ-џўџРџЎ)… -) "a-§ Q)* -) certainџџ-џўџРџЎ)ˆ -) feelinџџ-џўџРџЎ)rg-) consciousne-§ Q( @Зs-)s"џџ-џўџРџЎ)' -) which-§ Q)z -( ywis the outcome oџџ-џўџРџЎ( yСf-) an-§ Q)< -) organism'sџџ-џўџРџЎ)ж -) sensitivity-§ Q)Э -) tџџ-џўџРџЎ)o-) its-§ Q)< -) eџџ-џўџРџЎ)n-) vironment-§ Q)Ю -) (iџџ-џўџРџЎ)n-) this-§ Q)U -) sense,џџ-џўџРџЎ)x -) animals,џџ-џўџРџЎ)Ј -) in ( Гwso far as they acџџ-џўџРџЎ( ГКt-)  with reference-§ Q( Гѓ -) toџџ-џўџРџЎ)' -) events-§ Q) -) iџџ-џўџРџЎ)n-) theiџџ-џўџРџЎ)Xr-) џџ-џўџРџЎ) e-) nvironments,-§ Q( Гw -) arџџ-џўџРџЎ)'e-) conscious);-§ Q)№ -) andџџ-џўџРџЎ)H -) (2џџ-џўџРџЎ)*) -( эw"conscio-§ Q)Ќu-)sne-§ Q)Bs-)s"џџ-џўџРџЎ)' -) may-§ Q)V -) referџџ-џўџРџЎ)_ -) tџџ-џўџРџЎ)o-) a-§ Q)# -) fџџ-џўџРџЎ)o-)rm-§ Q)8 џџ-џўџРџЎ) o-)f-§ Q) -) awarenessџџ-џўџРџЎ)Ь -) "which-§ Q)Ž -) alwaysџџ-џўџРџЎ)Š -) has,-§ Q)O -) implicitlyџџ-џўџРџЎ)У -) aџџ-џўџРџЎ)t-)  least, ( 'wthe reference tџџ-џўџРџЎ( '–o-) an-§ Q)< -) 'Iџџ-џўџРџЎ)'-) in it"-§ Q)p -) (џџ-џўџРџЎ)i-) .eџџ-џўџРџЎ)#.-) ,-§ Q)  -) theџў-џ§џ€џ\)= -) term-§`Ѓ)\ -) "consciousne-§ Q( 'Жs-)s"џџ-џўџРџЎ)' -) may-§ Q)V -) meanџџ-џўџРџЎ)l -) self)E-) consciousne-§ Q( '0s-)s)џџ-џўџРџЎ)$ -( `w()Mindџџ-џўџРџЎ)j,-)  Self-§ Q)X -) anџџ-џўџРџЎ)2d-) Society) 165џџ-џўџРџЎ)X)-). 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