Question Set
2:
Below
are topic suggestions for papers.
You may also choose your own topic, though you should clear it with one
or both instructors first. Papers
should be 3-5 pages in length and are due Thursday 25 March unless special
arrangements have been made in advance.
1. Sober argues, ÒWhether genes
matter more than environment depends on
features of the world external to
JaneÕs own environment and genes.Ó
Explain and describe what you take
Sober to mean by this statement in
your own words. How and why does he arrive at this
conclusion? Do you
think that his reasoning in support
of this conclusion is sensible?
Why
or why not?
2. Lewontin argues that the analysis
of variance is not the analysis of
causes. Sesardic, in contrast, argues (1993, see especially pp.
402-406) that we can and should make
causal inferences on the basis of
ANOVA. He writes, Òit is an exaggeration to view any extrapolation
here
as being always as good (or bad) as
any other.Ó And, generalization
from a single ANOVA is Òrisky but
not in principle illegitimate.Ó
Compare and contrast Lewontin and
Sesardic on the question of whether
making causal inferences on the
basis of ANOVA is problematic.
Explain
and describe the rationales they offer
for their views. Finally,
explain which views you find most
persuasive and why.
3. Sesardic argues that heritability
estimates are not infallible, but
high heritability is a good ÒsignalÓ
indicating that one should look
further (for genetic causes of
traits). Compare and contrast
SesardicÕs
view on this subject with the views
endorsed by Block. Why does Block
say that the case of IQ is one where
heritability is perhaps not the
best measure of genetic influence?
4. Sterelny, Griffiths, and Dupre all suggest that we ask
incompatible
things of a species concept, and so
we are unlikely to find a single
concept that can do this job. Explain what this means and why they
think
it. Then assess whether they are correct.
5. One putative advantage of phenetic species concepts is that
they (like
the Diagnostic and Statistics Manual
of the American Psychiatric
Association) are "theory
neutral." That is, categories
judgments based on
similarity judgments can remain
constant through changing views of
population circumstances or
reproductive history. Dupre
explains why
phenetic species concepts have been
widely rejected, but goes on to call
for a 'semantic monism' that can
serve as a 'lingua franca' for various
groups, through processes of theory
change. Explain pheneticism and
why
(according to Sterelny, Griffiths,
and Dupre) it has been rejected.
Then,
explain Dupre's proposal. Does it differ from pheneticism? If so, how
so? Does it escape the problems of pheneticism?
6. Boyd's account of species (and of natural kinds more
general) diverges
from the 'orthodoxy' of considering
species to be individual populations.
Rather, Boyd holds that species are
members of 'property cluster kinds'.
Explain how Boyd's view differs from
pheneticism, and assess its prospects
as a theory of species, in light of
the species concepts reviewed by
Sterelny, Griffiths, and Dupre.
7. Millikan holds that historical kinds provide a basis for
induction
only on the grounds that we have
reason to believe that there are common
causes operating. This suggests that the 'divergence'
between various
uses of the species concept
suggested in Sterelny and Griffiths's, and
Dupre's works might be unified. Can they?