Fall 2004
Wed 2:00-5:00
Location: OSH 336
Elijah Millgram

What does logic, the theory of what counts as correct inference or reasoning, have to do with psychology, broadly understood as theory of how the mind works? On what throughout the twentieth century was the received view, the answer is: 'Nothing at all.' (The opposing answer, 'a good deal,' is called `psychologism,' and was usually just labelled 'the psychologistic fallacy.') The time has come to revisit the question, not least because recent work in the gray area between philosophy and cognitive science, and in practical reasoning (that is, the theory of how to figure out what to do), presupposes that some form of psychologism must be correct. However, that work has not examined the arguments that led to rejecting psychologism in the first place. We will look at both recent psychologistic and anti-psychologistic treatments of practical reasoning, at the anti-psychologistic arguments of Frege and Husserl, and at the recent return to psychologistic approaches towards theoretical cognition.

No prerequisites; in particular, the class does not presuppose a background in formal or mathematical logic. (Accordingly, this class will not satisfy the Philosophy Department's undergraduate or graduate logic requirement.) However, you may be more comfortable in the class if you've taken one or more advanced (5000-level or higher) courses in any of: metaphysics, epistemology, philosophy of mind or philosophy of language. Undergraduates may take this class with permission of the instructor.

• Readings

• Requirements

• Weekly Assignments

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